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Costs and Benefits of Monogamy and  
Polygyny for Yanomamö Women 
Raymond Hames 
Department of Anthropology, University of Nebraska–Lincoln, Lincoln, NE 68588, USA 
email rhames@unl.edu   
In this paper I analyze some of the economic costs and benefits of monogamy 
and polygyny for Yanomamö women. The evolutionary ecological model of re-
source defense polygyny predicts that when female choice is operative females will 
choose those males who control resources that will maximize a female’s reproduc-
tive success. A female will choose a polygynous strategy (i.e., become a co-wife) if 
a currently married male has more resources to offer than other unmarried males 
or monogamous males. This model has been successfully used to predict polyg-
ynous mating in tribal societies where males are stratified in terms of their own-
ership or control of land, cattle, or other wealth-producing resources (Borgerhoff 
Mulder 1985, 1987) and in state-level societies with extreme economic stratifica-
tion (Betzig 1986). Not considered in these models are the large group of societ-
ies in which polygyny exists but where males are not differentiated in terms of 
wealth- or resource-holding ability. The subject of this analysis, The Yanomamö In-
dians of Venezuela occupying drainages south of the upper Orinoco River, have 
a moderate rate of polygyny (e.g., approximately 25% of all married men in my 
sample are married polygynously), yet ownership of land, domesticated animals, 
or other wealth-producing resources is absent. Potentially, this means that polyg-
ynous women may be at an economic disadvantage because they, in effect, must 
share the economic resources of a husband who has no more wealth than a monog-
amous husband. In this report I seek to determine some of the economic costs and 
benefits of being a polygynously married woman. The analysis focuses on the eco-
nomic factors that potentially differentiate polygynous and monogamous house-
holds in terms of size of gardens, labor time of husbands and wives, and the flows 
of critical food resources to households. I find that the only statistically significant 
factor that differentiates monogamous households from polygynous households is 
that the latter receive more food resources from other households than the former. I 
conclude by suggesting that polygynous women avoid the potential costs of polyg-
yny because they are economically subsidized by other households in the village 
owing to the high social status of their husbands.     
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Theoretical Issues 
Recent cross-cultural and intracultural research on the causes of polygyny in-
dicate that either economic or social structural factors (warfare and fraternal in-
terest groups) are associated with polygyny (White and Burton 1988: 882-884). 
The association between male wealth and polygyny was first demonstrated cross-
culturally by Murdock (1949). Borgerhoff Mulder (1988), following Hartung’s 
(1982) cross-cultural survey (see also Grossbard 1976, 1980), clearly demonstrates 
that wealthy Kipsigis men are more likely to be polygynists (Borgerhoff Mulder, 
1985, 1987). White (1988) reverses the causal arrow by arguing that women’s la-
bor creates wealth that men use to acquire more wives (see also Boserup 1970). 
Finally, Grossbard (1980) shows that polygyny may also occur when co-wives 
work together to create economies of scale. 
In a recent cross-cultural study White (1988) encountered two general pat-
terns of polygyny, which he classified as wealth-increasing and sororal. What he 
called wealth-increasing polygyny is associated with warfare and the presence 
of fraternal interest groups. Where warfare and wife capture occur, women are 
valued because of their wealth-generating abilities, and they are most likely to 
generate wealth in rich, homogenous environments. Borgerhoff Mulder (1989) re-
sponded to White’s view by demonstrating that he may have the causal sequence 
partially reversed. Her data show that although women may create wealth, po-
lygynous men or men who become polygynous are initially wealthier than mo-
nogamous men. They have the bride price to marry more than one women and 
capital resources (e.g., land or cattle) to support an additional wife. Sororal po-
lygyny, in contrast, is associated with economically simple societies of the New 
World where polygynous men are unusually productive (e.g., skilled hunters) or 
who have high status (e.g., headmen or powerful shamans). Yanomamö polyg-
yny most resembles this form. 
The Yanomamö present an interesting case in that polygyny rates are mod-
erately high (see Low 1990 on measures of polygyny rates); yet capital holdings 
in economic resources (e.g., land or cattle) are nonexistent (Chagnon 1988, 1992), 
bride-price is absent (Chagnon 1979), and horticulture is not intensive (Hames 
1989). The goal of this paper is to determine the role, if any, that economic fac-
tors (characteristic of many economically egalitarian tribal societies) play in Ya-
nomamö polygyny. In brief, one wants to answer the following questions about 
economic performance by comparing polygynous and monogamous men and 
women: (1) Do polygynous men work more or more efficiently? (2) Do polygy-
nous men have larger gardens? (3) Do polygynous women work less than mo-
nogamous women? (4) Do patterns of Yanomamö reciprocity show that polygy-
nous families receive more food than monogamous families? 
The assumption that underlies the above questions is that Yanomamö women 
who marry polygynously are potentially economically disadvantaged because 
one husband must support two wives and their offspring with the only economic 
resource he has, his own labor. This question is important in a species where bi-
parental care is critical for reproductive success. One might argue that although 
polygynous women have to share the labor and resources of a single male they 
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only have to support a fraction of a male (one half, for example, if two women 
are married to the same man). Therefore, polygynously married women may not 
be worse off economically than monogamous women. One way to analyze these 
trade-offs is to compare consumer to producer ratios in polygynous and monog-
amous families. This measure is simply the number of consumers (the number 
of people in a household) per producer (the number of individuals who contrib-
ute to the household economy) (Sahlins 1972). Obviously, very young children 
are consumers, but they are not producers, and the age at which they become 
producers is an empirical question.1 For the Yanomamö this does not occur until 
about after the age of ten.
Figure 1 shows the effects of number of children per woman on the consumer-
to-producer ratios in monogamous and polygynous households. The model as-
sumes that the number of children per woman under monogamous and polygy-
nous unions are equal.2 With one child in the monogamous situation, there will 
be a ratio of two producers (husband and wife) per three consumers (husband, 
wife, and child) while under polygyny there will be three producers (husband and 
two wives) and five consumers (husband, two wives, and two children). The fig-
ure shows that polygynous households have higher consumer to producer ratios 
than monogamous households. Consequently, polygynous women are in house-
1. A productive adult counts as a single worker. A child is a fractional worker to the de-
gree that he or she measures up to adult work levels. See Hames (1994: 123, Figure 3) for 
data on child labor time allocation relative to adult standards. 
2. In fact, they are not. Polygynous households have a mean of 2.6 dependent children 
compared to 0.94 in monogamous households. Therefore, the comparison underes-
timates consumer-to-producer ratio in polygynous households because polygynous 
households have a ratio of 1.86 versus 1.47 for monogamous households.   
Figure 1. Consumer-to-producer ratios in polygynous and monogamous households.   
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holds where they or their husbands must work more or more efficiently if they are 
to achieve the same standard of living compared to monogamous households. This 
result is largely determined by the fact that polygynous households have twice as 
many children as monogamous households. Whether or not polygynous house-
holds will have higher consumer to producer ratios will depend on fertility differ-
entials between polygynous and monogamous women and the degree to which 
children make significant economic contributions to the household economy.3  
Sources of Economic Differentiation among the Yanomamö 
Yanomamö may differentiate themselves economically in terms of resources 
(goods) or labor (services) that they control. Among the Yanomamö resource dif-
ferences are minute and do not serve to significantly differentiate individuals or 
households. Differences that do exist are found largely in the possession of nonin-
digenous goods. In lightly contacted villages, one household may have two good 
machetes, an ax, and several aluminum pots while the other may have one worn 
machete, no ax, and one pot. However, Yanomamö can normally borrow these la-
bor-saving devices from co-villagers when needed. In contrast, villages with heavy 
mission contact typically contain several men, usually young, who work for mis-
sionaries and have superior wealth in terms of shotguns, outboard motors, canoes, 
and the like that give them added status. It is my impression that these young men 
tend to marry earlier, and, although they are monogamous because of mission-
ary demands, they seem to have more extramarital sexual relations.4 It is not un-
reasonable to predict that in the near future mission villages may begin to develop 
patterns of economic stratification that would lead to a wealth-based system of po-
lygyny or effective polygyny against a backdrop of socially imposed monogamy. 
For traditional Yanomamö men, economic status is a function of work effort, 
skill, and the degree to which one can command the labor or resources of others. 
As a result, these are the factors that will be examined to determine whether they 
affect Yanomamö economic patterns in polygynous and monogamous households. 
Hypotheses Regarding Yanomamö Polygyny 
Chagnon’s research on the Yanomamö (1979) demonstrates that female choice is 
strongly constrained by male domination and control of marriage transactions. 
He also notes the potential burden that polygyny places on males when they do 
not control extra material resources to support multiple wives. He suggests that 
3. Cross-cultural data (see the Summary in Borgerhoff Mulder 1990) consistently show that 
polygynous women (junior wives in particular) have lower fertility than monogamous 
women. However, these findings have no clear implication on the quality of offspring 
produced or whether junior wives, for example, could have done better by marrying mo-
nogamously. For a more recent and comprehensive review of the literature, see Pebley 
and Wariara (1989). 
4. See, for example, Holmberg’s (1950) account of the effect that gaining a shotgun had on 
the sex life of a Siriono hunter.    
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it is unlikely that such men work twice as efficiently or as hard as monogamous 
males; instead he proposes that polygynous men may have the ability to com-
mand the labor and resources of others. As I will show, data in this paper sup-
ports that interpretation. 
For the sake of this analysis, I temporarily assume that some degree of female 
choice is operative in regard to the decisions women make about who they will 
marry or continue to be married to. This will allow one to more carefully con-
sider the impact of polygyny on Yanomamö women. Even if female choice is ab-
sent among the Yanomamö, it is still useful to understand the comparative costs 
and benefits to women in polygynous and monogamous unions. I will return to 
the issue of female choice versus male control in Yanomamö marriage in the Dis-
cussion section. 
If a Yanomamö woman chooses to become a co-wife, she should do so if it al-
lows her to increase her reproductive success. Because I have no information on 
reproductive success of monogamous and polygynous women, I use indicators of 
potential enhancement of reproductive success. These are economic characteris-
tics of males that would make them attractive because they possess attributes that 
would enhance a woman’s fitness. For the Yanomamö, the following factors are 
likely critical male attributes in female mate selection: the ability to channel more 
food to wives and offspring, providing more care to offspring, or reducing wives’ 
workload. If female choice in marriage were operative, one or more of the fol-
lowing would have to be true of polygynous males: (1) Polygynous males work 
more or work more efficiently5 than monogamous males. (2) Polygynous males 
provide more direct childcare than monogamous males. (3) Polygynous males 
have larger gardens than monogamous males. (4) Polygynous households receive 
more food resources from other households.6 
If polygynous males possessed one or more of the four attributes listed above, 
polygynous women, compared to their monogamous sisters, may be attracted to 
polygyny because such women (1) work less than monogamous women, (2) al-
locate more time to childcare, or (3) they and/or their children have better diets. 
Also there may be advantages of being a co-wife that are more or less inde-
pendent of a husband’s economic activities and instead correspond to interac-
tion patterns among co-wives (Grossbard 1976; Irons 1983). For example, co-wife 
cooperation in economic tasks or childcare activities may lead to economies of 
scale, the consequences of which could lead to (1) reduced work loads or (2) more 
work accomplished in the same amount of time. As I will later detail, economies 
of scale may occur through co-wife cooperation, but one does not have to have a 
co-wife in order to cooperate. 
5. Measures of efficiency (return per effort) in economic activities were not collected. It is 
unlikely that such measures would show much significant variation in gardening and 
gathering, but they may be important in fishing and certainly are important for hunting 
(Hames 1989). 
6. In some societies the flow of services through garden labor exchange (Hames 1987; 
Hawkes 1983) is a way in which some households can subsidize others. Among the Ya-
nomamö, garden labor exchange is uncommon.   
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Finally, it is possible that being married to a high-status male could confer 
benefits on a woman’s offspring that are not directly related to a husband’s pro-
visioning his family. Hill and Kaplan show that offspring of high-status Aché 
males receive more care and protection from other band members (Hill and Ka-
plan 1988). Whether these benefits (or others such as a father’s assistance in mar-
riage negotiations on behalf of his son) accrue to offspring of high-status Yano-
mamö males will be considered in the Discussion section.  
VILLAGES AND METHODS 
Villages 
The data for this article was collected in 1986 and 1987 in the villages of Shero-
anateri, Mishimishimaböwei-teri, and Mosuu-teri.7 At the time of the research, 
Sheroana had fissioned into two sections that I will refer to separately by the 
names of their headmen: Krihisiwä and Rakoiwä. These villages are separated 
from one another by a ten-minute walk.8 When members of both villages co-re-
sided, they were collectively known as Sheronana-teri, the place name of a shal-
low stream (ca. 0.2-m depth) that serves as their main source of drinking water. 
They are still known by this name, but knowledgeable outsiders distinguish the 
location of each faction. Both are about a three- to four-day walk from the Sale-
sian Mission at Platanal and a half-day’s walk from the Orinoco River. 
In contrast, the village of Bisaasi-teri (or Mosuu-teri) is located directly across 
the Orinoco River from the Salesian Mission at Mavaca, where it occupies the 
confluence of the Mavaca and Orinoco Rivers. Compared to the other villages in 
this study, it is highly acculturated (Chagnon 1992), although it is the most con-
servative of the mission villages. Nearly all school-age children irregularly attend 
the mission school, adults frequently trade with local missionaries, and several 
young adults are employed by the mission in a variety of tasks, ranging from ele-
mentary school teaching to various types of manual labor. 
The village of Mishimishimaböwei is located in the headwaters of the Mavaca 
River. Although it is the most isolated of all villages in the sample (four- to five-
days’ travel from the nearest mission), it has been the subject of extensive re-
search (e.g., see Chagnon 1974 and references therein). During my time allocation 
study, approximately one half of the village was on trek (wayumö). 
The sociodemographic attributes of Yanomamö villages under study are dis-
played in Table 1.9 The data presented on economic performance of polygynous 
and monogamous Yanomamö represent various subsets of the individuals rep-
7. Mosuu is historically a part of Bisaai and Sheroana part of Patanowa (see Chagnon 1992 
for information on the history and politics of village movement and fissioning). 
8. When a village fissions but each portion chooses to live nearby, this living arrangement 
is known as he borarawä. It occurs when within-village disputes are too intense for people 
to amicably co-reside but yet the threat of raids from common enemies is too great for 
them to separate far from one another (Chagnon 1992: 87). 
9. Data presented here on marriages were collected by my colleague Napoleon Chagnon in 
the course of our joint fieldwork.   
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resented in Table 1. Their inclusion in subsequent analyses of economic perfor-
mance depends on whether they were full-time residents or if they had recently 
returned from a long absence and had not either set up a working garden or were 
not present for a sufficient period of time for me to collect reliable economic data. 
Approximately 25% of all married men are married polygynously.  
The existence of polyandrous marriages presents a special analytical problem 
and requires some comment. The Yanomamö word yedua means to “add to” or 
“combine with” and is used to refer to a male who has joined a household to share 
the wife or one of the wives of the resident male.10 In most cases it is a temporary 
state of affairs (cf. Equilior Garcia 1984: 85-86, who claims polyandrous marriages 
are long-term) and usually ends when the polyandrous male succeeds in gaining 
a wife of his own. In this study, all cases of polyandry occurred in the context of a 
polygynous marriage. In these situations, the senior male has sexual access to both 
wives, and the junior male has access to only one of the wives, which may be regu-
lated by the senior male (Napoleon Chagnon, personal communication). Normally, 
the second male in the arrangement is a young, close relative (usually a brother). 
The presence of another male in the household would reduce the consumer-
to-producer ratio and in most cases should be considered a separate marital form 
from monogamous and polygynous arrangements. In the data under consider-
ation, there were five polygynous-polyandrous unions. I have excluded all poly-
androus males from the analysis of labor time and garden size. Furthermore, I 
do not present garden size or exchange data on any of the households in the vil-
lage of Mishimishimaböwei, where three of the five polygynous-polyandrous 
unions occur. The remaining two polygynous-polyandrous unions, one each in 
Krihisiwä and Rakiowä, are more sexual than economic. In one case the polyan-
drous male does not have a garden and lives with his parents. In the other case, 
the polyandrous male has the smallest garden in the village, maintains a separate 
hearth, and is a visitor to the village.   
Table 1. Sociodemographic Attributes of Yanomamö Villages in Study 
                        Monogamous                          Polygynous             Polyandrous 
Village  Male  Female  Male  Female  Male  Total 
Mishi.  16  16  7  14  3  56 
Krihisiwä  8  8  4  8  1  29 
Rakoiwä  8  8  2  6  1  25 
Mosuu  20 20  4  8  0  52  
10. In some cases a monogamous male may share his wife. I have no data on the distribu-
tion of monogamous and polygynous forms of polyandry, but I suspect that the former 
(in areas where I have done research) is rarer than the latter. In this report all polyan-
drous arrangements involved a polygynous household. Early and Peters (1990: 40, 106-
107, 120) report relatively high rates of polyandrous unions for Yanomamö living in the 
Mujacai basin of Brazil, which Peters (Peters, 1982; Peters and Hunt 1975) attributes to a 
temporarily imbalanced sex ratio. There 25% of all births were from polyandrous unions. 
In the Mavaca area, where some of this research was conducted, Eguillor Garcia reports 
that 5.7% of all marriages are polyandrous and 3.4% polygynous-polyandrous (Eguillor 
Garcia 1984: 85). Finally, men generally regard polyandry as an inferior marital arrange-
ment while women may view it positively.  
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Time Allocation 
Behavioral sampling occurred in January, February, and March, the middle of the 
dry season.11 During this time, the Yanomamö frequently trek (wayumö) or engage in 
long-distance hunting (heniyomou) in preparation for multi-village feasts (reahu). In-
deed, during the behavior sampling period nearly all the able-bodied men in the vil-
lages of Krihisiwä, Rakoiwä, and Mishimishimaböwei engaged in overnight heniyo-
mou hunting lasting from three to five days. Although I sampled behavior during 
these periods, heniyomou days have been deleted (for males and females) in the pres-
ent analysis because most able-bodied men are expected to participate. Including 
these days would have reduced the variance in time allocation among all males. 
All measures of time allocation were gained through scan sampling (Altmann 
1974; Hames 1992b; Johnson 1975). At random hours of the day the behavior, lo-
cation, time, and interaction of all individuals within the shabono (village) and its 
immediate environs were recorded. If an individual was absent from observation 
because he or she was in the forest hunting, gathering, gardening, or fishing, a 
knowledgeable informant provided preliminary information about the absent per-
son’s activity. Such information was corroborated when the absent person returned 
to the village. For the four villages, a total of 11,912 observations were recorded 
for an average of 48 observations per individual. Observations were recorded from 
06:00 hours to 19:59 hours (a continuous period of 780 minutes or 13 hours), the 
typical time of rising in the morning and settling down to sleep in the evening. 
Thus, hours or minutes allocated to various activities may be estimated by multi-
plying the percentages in the tables and figures by 13 hours or 780 minutes. 
Food Sharing 
Data on food sharing was collected at the same time as data on time alloca-
tion (Hames 1992a). Following the method first described by Kaplan and Hill 
(1985a, 1985b), I recorded household food sharing in the following way: If in the 
course observing behavior an individual was eating, I identified the food con-
sumed and asked who had produced the food. If it was garden food, I recorded 
the household garden in which it was produced, and if was a wild resource I 
asked who obtained it from forest or stream.12 Scan-based food exchange data 
11. It could be argued that significant seasonal variation in time allocation could skew labor 
time results. However, there is no reason to believe that seasonal variation would affect mo-
nogamous and polygynous households differentially, and my initial time allocation research 
on the Yanomamö conducted in 1975-76 leads me to believe that although some kinds of ac-
tivity have a seasonal component (i.e., garden clearing in November and December, a task 
dominated by men), the overall level of work throughout the year is relatively stable. Fur-
thermore, garden size differences (presented below) between polygynous and monogamous 
males would be a good index for differential seasonal time allocation if there were any. 
12. Like many other groups (see Marshall’s 1961 work on the !Kung San), food exchanged 
by the Yanomamö may circulate through several households before it is actually con-
sumed. The data I present simply distinguish own-household versus other-household 
sources of food consumed. Intervening linkages in exchange are documented elsewhere 
using a different method (Hames 1990).    
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were collected from the villages of Mosuu, Rakoiwä, and Krihisiwä. Food ex-
change data was also collected from Mishimishimaböwei, but with a different, 
non-comparable method and therefore is not presented here (see Hames 1990 
for details).  
The first stage in analysis was to associate all consumers (i.e., eaters) and pro-
ducers with their respective households (also, see below). Defining household 
membership in most cases was relatively simple. Households own a garden or 
gardens and usually consist of a monogamous or polygynous nuclear family of 
two and sometimes three generations. Classificatory complications arise in the 
case of newlyweds going through the process of clearing their own gardens and 
old widows or widowers beginning to merge with the households of their mature 
children as they abandon their own gardens. These complications were statisti-
cally rare, and in both examples ownership of a producing garden determined 
household membership. 
The measures of household food exchange presented in Table 3 below are 
what I call outside consumption or exchange dependency. It is a measure of the 
proportion of food consumed by members of a domestic unit that was originally 
produced by other households. For example, 35% means that 35% of all food con-
sumed by household members was produced by other households and the bal-
ance of 65% indicates the percentage of food consumed by household members 
that was produced by themselves. 
Garden Size 
All gardens in the villages of Mosuu, Krihisiwä, and Rakiowä were mea-
sured by making a center line through the length of a garden and then measur-
ing 180° across the center line at 8-meter intervals. These measures were trans-
ferred to graph paper and scaled, lines at the edges were connected, and the 
area in square meters was estimated. A total of 40 gardens were measured, but 
only 30 are included for analysis. Because the goal of analysis is to compare 
the gardens of monogamous and polygynous men, 10 gardens were excluded 
because they belonged to widows (2), unmarried men (2), newly married men 
with no children who were still performing bride service (4), or polyandrous 
men (2). 
Units of Comparison 
Defining units of comparison in the analysis of polygynous and monoga-
mous families is problematic. The Yanomamö recognize what I would refer to as 
households as independent economic units. These units have their own gardens 
and are expected to be able to supply all their subsistence needs. At the core of a 
household is a monogamous or polygynous family consisting of a husband and 
wife or wives and their offspring. Most households conform to this simple struc-
ture. However, in some cases, core households may contain other families such as 
elderly couples who have attached themselves to a son’s household, widows and 
widowers, or young males who may be brothers to the core male. 
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RESULTS 
Garden Size 
Table 2 reveals that in two (Krihisiwä and Mosuu) of the three villages the house-
holds of monogamous males have larger gardens than the households of polygy-
nous males, in one village (Rakoiwä) polygynous males have larger gardens, and 
in all three villages combined, monogamous males make larger gardens than po-
lygynous males. In all comparisons, the differences are not statistically significant 
(Figure 2). 
It is worth noting that Chagnon (1992) has stated that village headmen tend 
to have the largest gardens in the village because of their responsibility for host-
ing village feasts (reahu). In the three villages sampled, the headmen of Rakoiwä 
and Krihisiwä have the largest gardens in their respective villages, while the aged 
headman of Mosuu-teri has one of the smallest gardens (at 1263 m2).13 
Labor Time Allocation 
In a comparison of labor time allocation, the unit of analysis becomes indi-
viduals instead of households, as was shown for garden size (above) and food 
sharing (below). The goal is to compare the labor efforts of monogamous and 
Figure 2. Garden size of polygynous and monogamous households. 
13. Although the aged headman of Mosuu-teri has one of the smallest gardens, he reput-
edly had “headman sized” gardens throughout his long tenure as headman. In addition, 
he can rely on close kin and in-laws to supply plantains for village feasts.   
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polygynous men and women. Figures 3 and 4 show that there are no statisti-
cally significant differences in labor time allocation in relation to marital sta-
tus for men or women. Although there is a significant inverted U-shaped (qua-
dratic) relationship between labor time and age (peaking at age 38) for men, 
polygynous men (mean age 43) are not significantly older than monogamous 
men (mean age 38).  
Table 2. Marriage Status by Garden Land Under Cultivation by Village 
  N  Mean m2  SD 
All villages 
 Monogamous households  19  2857  1510 
 Polygynous households  11  2784  2497 
Village of Krihisiwä 
 Monogamous households  4  2355  1743 
 Polygynous households  4  2185  1107 
Village of Rakoiwä 
 Polygynous households  3  4199  3335 
 Monogamous households  5  2955  1777 
Village of Mosuu-teri 
 Polygynous households  4  2322  3064 
 Monogamous households  10  3028  1347  
Figure 3. Male labor time by marital status.    
192     R.  H a m e s  i n  E t h o l o g y  a n d  S o c i o b i o l o g y  17 (1996)
Food Sharing 
Yanomamö food sharing is intense and occurs to varying degrees for all food 
types (Hames 1990). As described in the Methods section, data on food sharing 
were calculated using a behavioral observation technique. The data below indi-
cate the proportion of food observed being consumed for each food type that was 
produced outside of the eater’s household or domestic unit. For example, in Ta-
ble 3, 50% of the garden food consumed by polygynous household members was 
given to them by other households while the corresponding figure for monoga-
mous household members was 27%. 
As Table 3 and Figure 5 reveal, in each food category and for all combined, 
with the exception of gathered foods, polygynous household members gained a 
larger fraction of their food from other households. However, these differences are 
statistically significant only for garden foods (p = .01, T-test, two-tailed) and for 
all food exchanges combined (p = .03, T-test). The statistical significance of garden 
food exchange takes on added weight when one realizes that garden food supplies 
75% and more of all food calories consumed by Yanomamö (Hames 1989). 
Childcare and Marital Status 
Previously, I (Hames 1992b) showed labor time of polygynous men was never 
correlated with the number of their dependent children, and it was only occasion-
ally correlated for monogamous males. That is, male work load does not normally 
Figure 4. Female labor time by marital status.  
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increase with the number of dependent14 children, and this is especially true of po-
lygynous males. Still, it is possible that polygynous males may provide more direct 
childcare (i.e., holding, carrying, feeding, etc.) for children or that wives of polygy-
nous males might be able to provide more direct care for their children. The prob-
lem with this sort of analysis is that the amount of direct parental investment in 
offspring is extremely sensitive to the age of a dependent child (Hames 1992b: 90, 
Figure 1). This makes statistical analysis impossible given current sample size. Fur-
thermore, because polygynous men or women work the same amount of time as 
monogamous men or women (see above) it is doubtful that they would have any 
more “spare” time than monogamous parents to engage in direct childcare. With 
these caveats in mind, the following statistical point is made: Polygynous men have 
an average of 2.6 dependent children in their families compared to 0.94 for monog-
amous men, yet they spend fewer minutes per day (4.72) in direct childcare com-
pared to monogamous men (6.60). However, differences in number of children and 
time allocated to care by marriage type are not statistically significant.15  
Analysis of time allocation to direct childcare by monogamous and polygy-
nous women suffer from the same problems as it does for men. Although polyg-
ynous women had more dependent children and expectedly allocated more time 
to childcare then monogamous women, neither of these differences were statisti-
Table 3. Food Sharing (Outside Food) by Food Type for Monograms and Polygynous 
Households 
Household type  N  Mean  SD 
Fishing 
 Polygynous  11  40.90  29.48 
 Monogamous  18  21.27  28.72 
  significance p = .094 
Gardening 
 Polygynous  11  50.29  21.38 
 Monogamous  18  27.64  20.84 
  significance p = .01 
Gathering 
 Polygynous  11  26.20  38.17 
 Monogamous  18  30.09  29.82 
  significance p = .77 
Game 
 Polygynous  11  65.91  39.42 
 Monogamous  18  52.67  42.95 
  significance p = .39 
All foods 
 Polygynous  11  44.68  17.46 
 Monogamous  18  29.08  17.90 
  significance p = .03   
14. Dependent children are all children less than 10 years of age. This boundary is used be-
cause children begin to make major economic contributions to their own and family sub-
sistence at 10 years of age. 
15. These differences, if reliable, parallel Hewlett’s (1988) findings that polygynous Efe 
Pygmy men spend less time in childcare than monogamous men.  
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cally significant. However, it is possible that children in polygynous families re-
ceive more care from nonbiological parents than children in monogamous fami-
lies (e.g., Borgerhoff Mulder and Milton 1985)  
DISCUSSION 
The economic benefits and costs that accrue to polygynously married Yano-
mamö women is the central focus of this analysis. Given that polygynous Yano-
mamö men do not possess or control material resources commonly found in so-
cieties with resource defense polygyny (Borgerhoff Mulder 1990), one is led to 
suspect that polygyny compared to monogamy would be a costly reproductive 
choice for women because they must divide the economic efforts of a single hus-
band and thus live in a household with a higher consumer-to-producer ratio. This 
question naturally led to a comparison of labor time allocation, garden size, and 
food exchange patterns, the results of which I discuss immediately below. 
Labor time allocation statistics for monogamous and polygynous Yanomamö 
reveal that polygynous men do not work more than monogamous men and 
that polygynous women do not work more than monogamous women. While 
it is clear that polygynous women do not pay a penalty by having an increased 
work load, the result is puzzling when we know that polygynous families have a 
higher adult-to-consumer-to-producer ratio (1.86:1 and 1.5:1, for polygynous and 
monogamous families, respectively) and if we assume that the basic economic 
needs of each family are to be met solely by their own personnel.  
Figure 5. Yanomamö exchange by household type. 
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It is possible that polygynous Yanomamö men work more efficiently than mo-
nogamous men, leading them to get more work done in the same amount of time. 
Such differences would only emerge in highly skilled activities such as hunting. 
My previous research among a different group of Yanomamö (Hames, 1989) indi-
cates that the best hunters hunt two to three times more efficiently (measured in ki-
lograms of game per hour of hunting) than average hunters. However, there is a 
negative correlation between hunting efficiency and hunting time allocation such 
that good hunters hunt fewer hours per day than poor hunters (Hames 1992a: 214-
216). A possible reason that good hunters hunt less is the presumption that success-
ful hunters share game with co-villagers. Because there is no apparent16 compensa-
tion for sharing kills, there is little incentive for efficient hunters to hunt as much as 
poor hunters. Therefore, even if polygynous males were more efficient hunters, this 
benefit is not reaped by their wives or offspring (Hames 1990).17 Other productive 
activities include fishing, gardening, and gathering. While these activities require 
skill and expertise to be accomplished efficiently, there is little reason to suspect 
that there is great variation in skill among adult men or women that would lead to 
differences in the rates at which these tasks are accomplished. 
It is possible that economies of scale between co-wives would make polyg-
yny economically attractive and thus reduce the costs of dividing a husband’s la-
bor. Commonly, fishing, gathering, and gardening are done in groups. With the 
exception of poison fishing, none of the productive activities require cooperation, 
but it is highly likely that economies of scale are realized by coordinating differ-
ent tasks in a common activity.18 Nevertheless, monogamously married women 
frequently cooperate with each other and with polygynously married women. Al-
though I have not yet quantified the frequency at which women work in groups 
and their sizes, it is my strong impression that adult women very rarely leave the 
village without another adult as a companion.19 
Grossbard (1976) shows that cooperation in childcare is an important benefit 
of being co-wife. Assistance in childcare, regardless of its source, would be impor-
tant to a Yanomamö woman for a number of reasons. Yanomamö women spend 
an enormous amount of time in direct childcare (nursing, feeding, carrying, and 
16. It is entirely possible, as M. Borgerhoff Mulder points out to me (personal communi-
cation), that productive hunters may exchange game for other food resources such as 
garden produce. If this were true, then we might predict a kind of village-wide or ex-
tra-household division of labor where some families may be specialized in garden foods 
while others in hunting. While this could occur, it would be difficult for me to conclu-
sively evaluate such a pattern with current data. 
17. This situation contrasts sharply with groups such as the Aché, where good hunters 
share widely and their households gain fitness-enhancing benefits (Hames 1990). 
18. Economies of scale may be crucial for women with highly dependent offspring. Women 
carry infants in slings everywhere they go. When doing active or dangerous work (e.g., 
chopping firewood), the infant is usually handed to a companion for safekeeping. 
19. Furthermore, they frequently labor in groups of three or more that often contain men. 
Men accompany women sometimes to help (e.g., felling fruit trees), for fear that women 
may be abducted by raiders, or because a sexually jealous husband may believe his wife 
is sneaking off alone to tryst with another male.    
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holding) and indirect care through proximity maintenance (Hames 1992b). For 
example, the mother of a one-year-old child spends approximately 70% of her 
time within one meter of that child (Hames 1992b: 102).  
In many ways a nursing child is a virtual appendage of its mother. The child 
goes wherever the mother goes, and nursing women actually work less than non-
nursing women (Hames 1992b: 100, Table 4 and Figure 7). High-quality childcare 
is especially important for the Yanomamö, given that infant mortality rates range 
from 14% (Early and Peters 1990) to 33% (Melancon 1982) and that high-quality 
childcare is the most significant way in which a mother can protect a child from 
sources of morbidity and mortality in the Yanomamö environment. As men-
tioned earlier, the small sample size of young children and dramatic shifts in age-
related changes in care received by young children (Hames 1992b) precludes a 
comparison of total amount of care received by children of monogamous and po-
lygynous mothers. 
It is surprising that polygynous men do not make gardens significantly larger 
than monogamous men for the simple reason that, on average, polygynous men 
have significantly (t-test, p < .01, two-tailed) larger families (8.6 people) than mo-
nogamous men (5.0 people) and there is a positive correlation (r = 0.33, p = .03 
one-tailed, see Figure 6) between garden land under cultivation and family size. 
A hypothesized positive correlation between family size and garden land under 
cultivation assumes that each family unit is primarily responsible for supplying 
its own subsistence needs. Given the amount of food exchange between Yano-
mamö households, this assumption may not be warranted. Furthermore, even if 
such an assumption were reasonable, family size only explains about 11% of the 
variance in garden size. 
Figure 6. Garden size as a function of family size for monogamous and polygynous 
families.     
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The only significant economic difference that emerges between monogamous 
and polygynous households is that polygynous households received more food 
resources from other households. Therefore, one may conclude that the costs of 
sharing a husband who works no harder or efficiently than a monogamous hus-
band and who does not have a larger garden than average may be compensated 
for receiving more food resources through household food exchanges. It may also 
explain why polygynous women do not work more than monogamous women. 
Whether this degree of compensation is great enough to offset the cost of sharing a 
husband cannot be unequivocally known with currently available data. Neverthe-
less, I suspect that direct subsidization of households through the food exchange 
system is sufficient to obviate the negative economic effects of high consumer-to-
producer ratios in polygynous families. One way of evaluating the effect of subsi-
dization would be to predict that the nutritional status of polygynous households 
is either the same or better than that of monogamous households. 
The economic data presented do not show why Yanomamö women find po-
lygynous men attractive, but they do suggest that it is not economically inferior 
to monogamy. The major constraint on female choice is that Yanomamö men 
make decisions about marriage. Chagnon’s extensive and detailed analyses of Ya-
nomamö marriages (e.g., 1979) shows that Yanomamö men use their sisters and 
daughters to acquire wives in exchange from other men who do the same. In ef-
fect, the Yanomamö reflect Levi Strauss’s definition of marriage in egalitarian so-
ciety as the exchange of women between groups of men (Levi Strauss 1949). More 
recently, Chagnon (1989: 31-35) explicitly considers the issue of female choice for 
the Yanomamö). He notes a number of factors that point both to male coercion 
and to female choice. 
In many ways subsidization of polygynous households is similar to the find-
ings of Betzig (1988) for a chiefdom on the island of Ifaluk. There she found that 
chiefs and other high-status individuals received more food from other house-
holds than they gave (1988: 52-54). She also found that chiefs worked less than 
commoners. The simplest interpretation of this pattern is that high-status house-
holds are being subsidized by low-status households. In the case of the Ifalukese, 
the pattern of subsidization of chiefly households appears to be built into their 
system of hereditary inequality (Betzig 1988: 60). 
In contrast, the Yanomamö are a classic egalitarian society where status is 
achieved and not heritable, but their patterns of resource distribution resemble 
what is found in a system of hereditary inequality. The question we must ask of 
the Yanomamö is, Why are polygynous households economically subsidized by 
monogamous households? To answer this question we must deal with the ques-
tion of status achievement. In egalitarian societies high status is achieved (and not 
ascribed) in a variety of ways dependent on how individuals measure up to lo-
cal culture standards (Irons 1979). Among the Yanomamö, the main avenue for 
achievement of high status is through political leadership (Chagnon 1988, 1992). 
Effective political leaders represent the interests of their kin and co-villagers 
through political negotiations and, as is often necessary, through force of arms 
in dueling and raiding. As a result of this latter dimension of political leadership, 
high-status males are very likely to  have killed an enemy and become an unokai 
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or man killer. Chagnon (1988) has shown that unokais are much more likely to be 
polygynous than non-unokais. This relationship may help us to understand the 
economic subsidization of polygynous households: Leaders are rewarded for ex-
pending effort and risking their lives in the political arena with polygyny and the 
economic support of their households. 
This answer still leaves us with the question of what benefits, if any, accrue to 
a woman who becomes a co-wife to a high-status male. At this point I can only 
suggest some hypotheses to investigate. It may be the case that high-status males 
are better able to ensure that their sons marry earlier in a milieu of high male-
male competition over mates. Or, the economic benefits (through household sub-
sidization) of becoming a co-wife are superior to the alternative of marrying a 
single male. These hypotheses could be investigated with quantitative data on 
marital success of children born to polygynous women or nutritional status of 
offspring in polygynous and monogamous families. 
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